Governance of the South Pacific tuna fishery by Petersen, Elizabeth
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The South Pacific tuna fishery is the largest and most valuable
tuna fishery worldwide. There are two major concerns with
current governance of the fishery: the Pacific island countries
are not deriving as much benefit from its exploitation as they
could; and current management strategies will not ensure long-
term sustainability of the resource. These concerns are
addressed by highlighting key opportunities for sustainable
economic development. These opportunities include regional
cooperation in determining a total allowable catch for the
region and how it is allocated among individual island states;
setting the total allowable catch on the grounds of sustainability
and maximisation of economic rents; and the auctioning of
entitlements among individual fishers. Concerns regarding
fishery policy in many Pacific island countries are also
presented with suggestions for policy reform.
Most Pacific island countries have a narrow
resource base and small domestic markets,
resulting in heavy dependence on a small
number of export commodities. Economic
growth for the Pacific islands region as a
whole has been slow due to insecure and
poorly defined institutional structures. The
South Pacific tuna fishery is the Pacific
islands’ main natural resource. A United
Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) seminar
on promoting exports of fish and fishery
products in developing countries held in
1996 concluded that tuna stocks have the
greatest potential for the expansion of
exports from Pacific island countries
(Sawhney 1996). The dependence on tuna is
already unmatched elsewhere in the world
and is likely to increase, causing the
ownership of tuna and the right to harvest it
to be sensitive political issues in the Pacific
island countries.
There are two major concerns with
current governance of the fishery. The first is
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that the Pacific island nations are not
deriving as much benefit from its
exploitation as they could. The annual
average tuna harvest from the region is
currently about 1 million metric tonnes with
a landed value close to US$1.7 billion (Tarte
1999). Approximately 90 per cent of this
yield is harvested by distant-water fishing
nations who pay access fees of
approximately 4 per cent of their gross
revenue. Bertignac et al. (2001) argued that
the economic rent (the difference between
the value of the catch and the economic cost
of the fishing effort) potential is currently
around 13 per cent of gross revenue and,
with a change in fleet structure, could be up
to 40 per cent.
The second major concern with the
governance of the South Pacific tuna fishery
is that current management strategies will
not ensure long-term sustainability of the
resource. Unlike most other tuna fisheries
worldwide, this fishery is not being
overexploited. In fact, three out of the four
major species in the fishery could
sustainably endure higher catch rates
(Hampton et al. 1999). There are very few
differences between the South Pacific tuna
fishery and other tuna fisheries of the world.
The main reason it has not been over-fished
to date is its remoteness from many distant-
water fishing nations. However, interest in
the Pacific islands region by international
fishing companies is increasing. Institutional
structures currently in place cannot ensure
that future exploitation will not lead to
harvest rates greater than the natural rate of
regeneration. It is imperative that the
governance of the South Pacific tuna fishery
is strengthened now before over-fishing takes
place.
The aim of this paper is to address these
concerns by highlighting key opportunities
for sustainable economic development of the
industry and by drawing attention to
weaknesses in government policy in many
Pacific island countries.
The South Pacific tuna fishery
Within the Pacific islands region, there are
200 high islands and 2,500 low islands and
atolls that comprise the 22 countries and
territories of the Pacific islands. The
negotiations of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982
(which was not ratified until 1994) gave
coastal nations rights to resource use over
the sea area within 200 miles of their
coastline, an area known as the exclusive
economic zone (United Nations 1994).
Several of the Pacific island countries and
territories have considerable amounts of
ocean in their control with ocean area
exceeding landmass by an average factor of
300 to 1 (Figure 1) (World Bank 2000b).
The Pacific islands are the most
important fishing region in the world. The
region supplies an estimated one-third of all
landed tuna, 40–60 per cent of total supply
to tuna canneries, and 30 per cent of tuna to
the valuable Japanese sashimi (raw fish)
market (Gillett et al. 2000; Secretariat of the
Pacific Community  2000). The annual
average tuna harvest from the Pacific islands
region is currently about 1 million metric
tonnes with a landed value close to US$1.7
billion (Tarte 1999).
The four major tuna species that inhabit
the South Pacific fishery are skipjack
(Katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin (Thunnus
albacares), bigeye (Thunnus obesus) and
albacore (Thunnus alalunga). According to
Hampton et al. (1999), although there are
significant variations among harvests of
skipjack (67 per cent of total catch), yellowfin
(19 per cent of total catch) and albacore
(3 per cent of total catch), fishing is having
little impact on stock levels of these species.
In fact, these species could sustain higher
catch rates (Hampton et al. 1999). However,
bigeye tuna (5 per cent of total catch) is slower
growing and longer lived than the other
species, and is therefore less effective at
regenerating after fishing. The decline in adult
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biomass of bigeye tuna since the 1970s has
raised concern that harvest rates of this
species have already reached unsustainable
levels.
There are three main forms of harvesting
tuna
• purse-seining,  targeting skipjack and
yellowfin
• pole-and-lining, targeting skipjack and,
to a smaller extent, yellowfin
• longlining, targeting yellowfin, bigeye
and albacore.
Longlining is the traditional harvest
form. Pole-and-line fishing became popular
in the 1970s to early 1980s but has since
waned with the introduction of purse-
seining, which now accounts for
approximately 75 per cent of total tuna catch.
The purse-seine fishery developed rapidly
in response to improved technological ability
to fish the deeper thermocline found in the
South Pacific tuna fishery; poor fishing
conditions in the eastern Pacific Ocean and
the emergence of the Korean, Taiwanese and
Japanese purse-seine fleets.
The share of the South Pacific harvest
taken by Pacific island countries is extremely
modest, at around 10 per cent. The remaining
90 per cent of the value of the catch is taken
by distant-water fishing nations, mainly
Japan, Taiwan (Province of China), the
Republic of Korea and the United States
(Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2000).
The distant-water fishing nations pay access
fees to the Pacific island countries for the right
to fish in their waters. These revenues are
increasing. For example, in 1999 fees
amounted to US$60.3 million, 403 per cent
greater than that reported by Clarke (1983).
These licence fees contribute significantly to
the public revenue of many Pacific island
countries such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, the
Federated States of Micronesia and the
Marshall Islands (Table 1). Fish products
dominate export activities in the Marshall
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and
Kiribati, which have established local tuna-
fishing activities through joint ventures with
distant-water fishing nation firms. However,
fishing as a share of GDP is likely to be
underestimated in the Pacific island
countries where marine products play a
large role in domestic food consumption in
their primarily subsistence economies.
Opportunities for sustainable
economic development of the
South Pacific tuna industry
There are two major concerns with current
governance of the South Pacific tuna fishery:
the Pacific island countries are not deriving
as much benefit from its exploitation as they
could; and current management strategies
will not ensure long-term sustainability of
the resource. Three key areas are highlighted
in this paper as opportunities for sustainable
economic development: regional tuna
management, restricting the total allowable
catch and the auctioning of resource
entitlements.
Regional tuna management
Prior to the 1980s, all deep-sea fish stocks
were subject to open access, and typical
problems arising from such open-access
arrangements were widespread. This
‘tragedy of the commons’ was partly resolved
with the negotiation of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea that gave
state-property rights to coastal states over
their exclusive economic zones. The
individual Pacific island states have
exercised weak governance over their regions
of jurisdiction. Little control has been placed
on fishing effort, and institutional structures
are weak and often established on a
temporary basis in reaction to particular
circumstances. Unlike most tuna stocks in
the world, the South Pacific tuna fishery
remains healthy (with the exception of bigeye
tuna). However, there is only one significant
difference between South Pacific tuna stocks
	
	 	&	 '((

	
	
 !"##$"%"$!!
Fi
gu
re
 1
T
h
e 
S
ou
th
 P
ac
if
ic
 r
eg
io
n
: e
xc
lu
si
ve
 e
co
n
om
ic
 z
on
es
S
ou
rc
e:
 S
ec
re
ta
ri
at
 f
or
 t
he
 P
ac
if
ic
 C
om
m
u
ni
ty
 (
re
p
ro
d
u
ce
d
 w
it
h 
p
er
m
is
si
on
).
20N
EQ
20S
40S
12
0E
14
0E
16
0E
16
0E
14
0E
12
0E
18
0
16
0W
14
0W
16
0W
18
0
14
0W
Fr
e
n
c
h
 P
o
ly
n
e
sia
P
itc
H
a
w
a
ii
Jo
h
n
st
o
n
P
a
lm
yr
a
 H
o
w
la
n
d
 &
 B
a
ke
r
To
n
g
a
 C
o
o
k
Is
la
n
d
s
  A
m
Sa
m
o
a
N
iu
e
Fi
ji
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
W
a
lli
s 
&
 F
u
tu
n
a
Sa
m
o
a
K
iri
b
a
ti
P
h
o
e
n
ix
  L
in
e
Is
la
n
d
s
Ja
rv
is
To
ke
la
u
Tu
va
lu
N
a
u
ru
So
lo
m
o
n
 Is
A
u
st
ra
lia
V
a
n
u
a
tu
   
N
e
w
 
C
a
le
d
o
n
ia
N
o
rf
o
lkM
a
tt
h
e
w
&
 H
u
n
te
r
P
a
p
u
a
 N
e
w
 G
u
in
e
a
M
a
rs
h
a
ll
Is
la
n
d
s
Fe
d
e
ra
te
d
 S
ta
te
s 
o
f 
M
ic
ro
n
e
sia
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
M
a
ria
n
a
s
G
u
a
m
  M
in
a
m
i
To
ri 
Sh
im
a
P
a
la
u
W
a
ke
	 
   	
	  

+
	
	
 !"##$"%"$!!
and those elsewhere—it is more isolated from
many distant water fishing nations and
hence has taken longer to exploit. The South
Pacific tuna fishery is now the focus of a
growing number of fishing nations.
Many commentators argue the benefits
of a strong common-property regime where
Pacific island countries and territories make
collective decisions on the governance of the
fishery (for example, Maxwell and Owen
1994; van Santen and Muller 2000; World
Bank 2000b). However, Petersen (2001)
argued that the most cost-effective
institutional structure is one that keeps
collective decision making to a minimum for
various reasons
• a perception that multilateral agreements
compromise a country’s sovereign rights
• the lack of supporting institutions that
could compel or impose an agreement
• the benefits and costs of implementing
new institutions are unevenly
distributed among Pacific island
countries
• the fear that multilateral negotiations
may result in a reduction in bilateral aid.
Because of the migratory nature of fish
stocks, placing controls on catch size is
necessarily a regional issue. The setting of
the total allowable catch for the region is the
only decision that must be made at the
collective level. To minimise transaction
costs, all other decisions should be made at
the state level.
It is advocated here that a total allowable
catch should be determined for the whole
Pacific islands region; then individual
country quotas of the total allowable catch
should be allocated through a negotiated
formula based on tuna concentrations in the
exclusive economic zones and current
catches from the high seas. Individual
countries should then be responsible for
allocating and adjusting quota entitlements
Table 1 The importance of the fishing industry for selected Pacific island countries
Government revenue Exports GDP
(per cent) (per cent of total value) (per cent)
Cook Islands .. 41 (1999) ..
Fiji .. 7 (1997) 1.4 (1998)
FSM 29 (1998) 92 (1997) 15.5 (1990)
Kiribati 61 (1998) 53 (1993) 9.5 (1993)
Marshall Islands 25 (1993) 94 (1997) ..
New Caledonia .. 27 (1996) ..
Palau 5 (1993) - ..
Papua New Guinea 2 (1999) 0.6 (1999) ..
Samoa .. .. 6.2 (1999)
Solomon Islands approx. 5 (1993) 20 (1993) 9.0 (1993)
Tonga .. 18 (1998) ..
Tuvalu approx. 35 (1993) - 5.0 (1993)
Vanuatu - <1 (1993) ..
Sources: TISES, 1996. New Caledonia Facts and Figures, Territorial Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies, Noumea; Duncan, R. and Temu, I., 1997. ‘Trade, investment and sustainable development of
natural resources in the Pacific: the case of fish and timber’, in Enhancing Cooperation in Trade and Investment
between Pacific Island Countries and Economies of East and South-East Asia, UNESCAP, New York, Volume
1:175–211; Bank of Papua New Guinea (2000). Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea,
Port Moresby; ESCAP, 2000 and 2001. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific. UNESCAP, Bangkok; World
Bank, 2000a. Cities, Seas, and Storms: managing change in Pacific island economies, Vol. I, Summary Report,
World Bank, Washington, DC.
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among individual fishers (the auctioning of
vessel licences is advocated later in this
paper).1
This raises the question of who should
set the regional total allowable catch and
how it is allocated among the Pacific island
countries. With the September 2000 signing
of the Multilateral High Level Convention
on the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean (MHLC 2000) the
time is ripe for discussing this issue. All
coastal and distant-water fishing nations
and territories (except Japan) signed the
Convention, which requires the
establishment of a Commission responsible
for promoting cooperation and coordination
among members to ensure the conservation
of fish stocks. The Commission does not have
an organisational structure as yet, and due
to the time needed for ratification, it is not
expected to come into force until at least 2003.
Careful consideration must be given to how
it is constituted due to the political sensitivity
of the issue and the potential benefits that can
be derived from strong institutional structures
for governance.
The Convention does not necessitate nor
preclude the Commission from setting the
total allowable catch for the fishery. The
question of whether the total allowable catch
should be established by the Commission
(which includes distant-water fishing
nations) or by the Pacific island countries
alone should be debated. It is argued here
that this decision is a concern for Pacific
island countries alone and, unless the voting
process of the Commission gives appropriate
weight to Pacific island countries, it is
therefore an issue that is outside the
Commission’s jurisdiction. A regional body
encapsulating all Pacific island countries
should decide on the level of the total
allowable catch, and how this catch is
allocated among Pacific island countries.
The body that currently represents the largest
number of Pacific island nations on fisheries
matters is the Forum Fisheries Agency that
includes the 16 independent or self-
governing countries of the region.2 However,
the eight territories should also be party to
this decision.3 The enforcement of a total
allowable catch for the region is an issue that
should be given top priority by the Pacific
island countries. Without rectifying this
issue, the sustainability of the tuna resource
remains at risk.
Restricting the total allowable catch
Economists term the maximum economic
yield as the level of fishing effort where the
difference between total revenue and total
cost is the greatest. For harvest rates beyond
the maximum economic yield, any increase
in effort has a diminished return and profit
is decreased. Biologists term the maximum
sustainable yield as the maximum
sustainable level of fishing effort that leaves
the resource under no threat of depletion.
Generally, the maximum economic yield is
less than the maximum sustainable yield.
Hence, limiting fishing effort by more than
what the resource can sustainably maintain
leads to an increase in revenue derived from
the industry.
While evidence suggests that tuna in the
South Pacific is not being over-exploited
biologically (that is, fish harvests are not
beyond the maximum sustainable yield),
evidence suggests that it is being over-
exploited economically (that is, fish harvests
are beyond the maximum economic yield).
Currently, there is excess capacity in both
fishing vessels and canneries, at least for
surface tuna such as skipjack. Van Santen
and Muller (2000) argued that this excess
capacity is a result of the large expansion in
catches and canned tuna production,
industry consolidation, protected market
blocs in Europe and the United States (which
stimulate over-investment), improvements in
technology and expansion of fishing grounds
in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Van Santen and Muller (2000) also argued
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that the excess capacity has resulted in a
decline in raw material prices by some 50
per cent in real terms over the last two
decades. While demand for tuna is linked to
other substitutes such as pork and chicken,
tuna prices have historically shown large
swings due to changes in supply. Further-
more, with the region servicing 40–60 per cent
of tuna for canneries, a reduction in tuna
supply would almost certainly lead to an
increase in price. Bertignac et al. (2001)
estimated the demand elasticity for raw tuna
supplied to the canning markets by purse-
seine and pole-and-line fleets in the South
Pacific to be 1.55, and that of the fresh and
frozen tuna supplied by longline fleets to be
2.53.
Bertignac et al. (2001) also argued that
the overall level of effort of the fishery is sub-
optimal. They used a tuna population
dynamics model (spacially disagreggated,
multi-gear, multi-species simulation model)
interfaced with a simplex optimisation
algorithm to attempt to locate an optimal
level and mix of technologies given the
objective of maximising economic rents in the
long run. The current access fee structure of
4 per cent of the gross revenue of the distant-
water fishing nations was assumed. It was
found that maximised annual economic
rents could be more than doubled by reducing
the effort of all fleet technologies. Further-
more, when they relaxed the assumption of
access fees being 4 per cent of total catch
value, they found that the true economic rent
could be around 13 per cent of revenue at
1996 levels of effort, and 40 per cent with
reduced fishing effort (although these figures
differ across harvest technologies).
While fish stocks themselves are not in
jeopardy, reducing fishing effort is likely to
lead to an increase in fishing revenue by
fishing companies and hence, an increase in
potential access fees derived by the Pacific
island countries. It is understood that
immediate reduction in fishing effort may
have significant political ramifications.
However, a gradual decrease is likely to be
rewarding. Such increased restrictions on
fishing effort would allow the Pacific island
nations to exercise more strongly the
precautionary principle in an industry that
is notoriously difficult to govern due to the
dynamics in fishery size and the long-term
nature of investments.
Allocation and transfer of
resource entitlements
Currently, entitlements are allocated through
the licensing of vessels. Very few restrictions
are placed on the number of vessels, hence
licensing acts as a mechanism for monitoring
fishing activity. Licence fees are based on the
estimated value of the catch, assessed in
advance on the basis of catch taken in
previous years. It is no surprise that under-
reporting is evident. The Forum Fisheries
Agency estimated that 45 per cent of catch
was not reported in 1992 (Gillett et al. 2000).
Duncan and Temu (1997) state that under-
reporting is particularly common by vessels
from Taiwan (Province of China) and the
Republic of Korea. If true, the Pacific islands
countries are losing a considerable amount
of resource revenue and the sustainability of
the industry is in jeopardy.
Vessel licences are allocated and
transferred among resource users through
international treaties. As these are negotiated
by resource managers, there is no guarantee
that the negotiated access fees reflect the true
value of the economic rent. Bilateral aid is
often given in exchange for cheaper access,
as well as the offer of side payments to
resource managers. These international
treaties are not transparent, give incentives
to underreport and do not ensure the most
efficient are allocated the access rights.
Alternative mechanisms for allocating and
transferring entitlements need to be
considered.
The mechanism recommended here is
market allocation and adjustment through
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the auctioning of vessel licences. One
attraction of an auction system is that it taxes
the full economic rent without having to
know its true value. Bertignac et al. (2001)
estimated these economic rents to be about
13 per cent (assuming 1996 levels of fishing
effort) compared with the current 4 per cent.
The true value of the economic rent is highly
uncertain as it depends on the value of the
fish caught and the cost of fishing effort.
Hence, the auctioning of fishing rights allows
the resource manager to maximise the
economic rent while only needing to know
enough detail on the dynamics of the
industry to be able to set a reserve price for
each licence. The uncertainty associated with
the dynamics of the system is transferred to
the fishing companies (although at a price
as the bids will be discounted to reflect this
uncertainty). Licence auctions should be held
regularly so that entitlements can be bought
and sold at market price. Duncan and Temu
(1997) also recommend the auctioning of
fishing entitlements in the South Pacific.
The assumption that the auctioning of
entitlements ensures that the most efficient
firm receives the entitlement depends on a
few market requirements. The first
requirement is that the transaction costs
associated with market allocation are less
than the efficiency gains. However, there can
be little doubt that the potential efficiency
gains derived from extracting the full
economic rents in licence fees and the
decrease in corrupt practices and rent-
seeking at the political level will be
substantial.
The second requirement for the efficient
auctioning of entitlements is that bidding is
competitive. With 1,300 vessels from ten
different countries fishing in the region and
the likelihood that market allocation will
encourage more entrants into the industry,
auctions will almost certainly be competitive
(Duncan and Temu 1997). However, auction
design will be important and must be given
due attention. Country cooperatives must be
banned from participating in the auction
with only distant-water fishing firms being
allowed to bid. Further, zero-auctions could
be introduced in line with the New South
Wales fishery whereby a proportion of each
existing fisher’s rights are put to auction, with
the ability of the fisher to buy back their share
in a competitive market. If the fishers buys
back their quota, no revenue changes hands.
If the quota is sold, the holder of the right
receives full market price. The purposes of
the zero-auction are three-fold: to create a
mature market as quickly as possible, to
guarantee new entrants into the industry,
and to reduce the ease with which people
can form and maintain local monopolies
and/or oligopolies (Young 1995).
Other advantages of the auction system
are that they encourage self-monitoring and
self-enforcing. Making monitoring and
enforcement a matter of self-interest is crucial,
given the extensive area of ocean through
which the tuna migrate, and the fiscal
constraints of the Pacific island countries.
The auction system significantly lessens the
likelihood of under-reporting compared with
the present system where access fees are
related to catch size. Additionally, if by-catch
is retained, the accuracy of reporting will be
improved further. Self-enforcement is
encouraged as licence-holders themselves
will monitor illegal fishing activity. Excess
fishing would decrease the value of the
fishery, jeopardising the security of the
licence-holder’s investment. At present, the
licence fees are reportedly well below the true
economic rent, giving little incentive to report
illegal activity.
An auction system also provides
flexibility and an investment guarantee for
investors. At the end of the life of the licence
(say 10 years), the system can be reviewed
and necessary changes can be implemented
before auctioning the licences for a further
term. In this way, investors know when the
review is due to take place and are prepared
for change. This strategic approach provides
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secure entitlement to fishers for a period, to
provide strong incentive to manage fish
stocks rationally. Moreover, the auction
system means that the fishing revenue of the
Pacific island country is known in advance
and is stable over the specified licence period.
This increased fiscal stability would aid
budgetary planning and obviates the need
for revenue-stabilising mechanisms where
fish revenue is a large component of total
revenue. The fishing firm bears all the price
and output risk (although at a discounted
price).
Other options on this proposal could be
debated. For example, if distant-water fishing
nations resent bearing the revenue risk
(associated with price and catch
fluctuations), a risk-sharing alternative
could be considered where the licence fee is
not only dependent on the successful bid but
on something correlated with the true value
of the resource (that is, tuna price), as is
achieved by royalties. An alternative with
extra investment security could also be
considered. A proportion (say 60 per cent of
rights) could be issued in perpetuity with
compulsory return of the remaining
proportion. Users still have the option of
selling their proportion that was issued in
perpetuity via auction. This system provides
investment security while still allowing new
entrants into the market.
This proposal for auctioning fishing
entitlements should be the focus of further
research. Lessons from the auctioning of
television or mobile phone spectrum, another
common-property natural resource, could be
used in this research. The design of the
auction system will be of utmost importance
to ensure they are competitive and efficient.
The opportunities highlighted have
focused on potential institutional and policy
changes at the regional level. However, there
is cause for concern that other government
policies in the Pacific island countries are
not ensuring the maximum benefits are
derived from the industry in the long term.
Government policy
Many of the region’s governments have
invested many millions of dollars of aid
funds or public revenues into the tuna
industry. These investments have been made
with the government as sole owner and
operator, or in joint ventures with foreign
countries (predominantly Japan and the
United States). No government has entered
into a major joint venture with its own private
sector (Asian Development Bank 1997).
Unfortunately, all the investments that have
been operating for more than two years, with
only a few minor exceptions, have been
unprofitable and have required additional
massive injections of public funds. Most
government tuna ventures have failed, some
repeatedly. Furthermore, Doulman (1989)
remarked that while in the past joint ventures
have been considered to be the most
appropriate means of promoting industrial
fisheries development in the Pacific islands
region, their benefits have been far below
expectations, with difficulties arising in
revenue raising, management and control.
There is no reason for this kind of government
involvement, as may be necessary in land-
based business activities where property
rights to land may need government backing
of some kind. Property rights to the exclusive
economic zones are owned by the
government and it can pass them on to quota
holders, knowing that there will not be
claims for future compensation by
landholders.
Public sector tuna ventures may be seen
to have economic importance as a source of
employment and foreign exchange. For these
reasons, some public sector vested interests
have sustained their operation despite their
financial losses. The Asian Development
Bank (1997) advanced the following
determinants of this lack of profitability:
inadequate management, weak direction at
the board level (usually composed of civil
servants), inappropriate government-
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operating procedures, deteriorating prices,
low labour productivity, shortages of fish and
comparatively high-cost operations.
Private investment in tuna ventures has
been scarce compared to public investment.
However, some cases have proved successful.
Private ventures in Fiji, the Cook Islands,
Tonga and Kiribati show promise, and the
domestic commercial fishing fleets in Papua
New Guinea and Samoa are growing due to
certain improved economic conditions.
Improved economic conditions in Samoa
resulting from the government’s attempts to
improve the economic environment for
private sector profitability, among other
things, have led to the growth of domestic
fishing fleets. This is evidence that fishing
industries can develop with little support,
provided markets can be found. Pollard
(1995) and Asian Development Bank (1997)
argued that the lack of private investment in
tuna ventures is due to the lack of resource
rights; the comparatively high-cost, high-risk
and high-skill requirements of the industry;
as well as the evidence of consistent
government failure in the industries. In
addition, the protected and internationally
non-competitive nature of the Pacific island
economies deter investment and competition.
Government policy can proceed in a
number of ways. The regional governments
could maintain their direct ownership and
operation. However, this is likely to result in
continued financial losses at the expense of
foregone opportunities for the private sector.
Doulman (1989) concluded that public
investment is unlikely to be the most
satisfactory and financially rewarding
means of developing a locally based tuna
industry. McCoy and Gillett (1997) noted
that, at 1997 fish prices, only the Japanese
and US purse-seine operators in the South
Pacific were profitable; Taiwan (Province of
China) was just breaking even, and the
Republic of Korea was incurring net losses
in their operations. It is not appropriate that
governments or aid agencies should be
investing in such high-risk commercial
ventures.
Most Pacific island governments have
provided cheap access to fishing rights for
foreign fishers in exchange for them setting
up local industrial activity. However, such a
policy commits the cardinal policy sin of
trying to achieve two objectives with the one
policy instrument (Tinbergen 1952). The two
objectives are to maximise economic rent and
to establish domestic-based industry.
Subsidising resource access in exchange for
local activity achieves neither goal well. The
amount of the effective public subsidies paid
out in the form of low-cost access and in
exemptions from taxes is unknown.
Experience has shown that as few local
activities have been financial successes, these
subsidies have been dissipated to create a
few, likely short-term, jobs. If it is considered
beneficial to subsidise foreign firms to invest
locally, subsidies should be explicit, rather
than provided in non-transparent ways as
at present.
Direct encouragement of locally based
foreign direct investment also exists in the
Federated States of Micronesia agreement,
which aims to encourage foreign vessels and
operators to relocate to the Pacific islands
region through preferential licensing.
Moreover, the Forum Fisheries Agency
member countries banned trans-shipment at
sea in June 1993. Not surprisingly, port
activity at trans-shipment points increased
markedly with the ban, and evidence
suggests that the ban decreased under-
reporting of catches (SPC 1994). However,
compulsory port trans-shipment is a very
high-cost way of encouraging local
economic activity and monitoring fish
mortality. It leads to only a limited
domestication of activities. Furthermore, the
willingness to pay for licence fees by distant-
water fishing nations will decrease to cover
these increased transaction costs. Duncan
and Temu (1997) noted that the Pacific island
countries are effectively paying for trans-
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shipment through a public subsidy. The
proposed auction system ensures greater
self-enforcement and negates the need for
banning trans-shipment by sea.
Government policy could proceed by
stimulating the domestic private sector to
invest in the industry. While, historically,
private ventures have had greater success
than public ventures, this policy assumes
that such investment is of greater social
benefit than had the funds been spent
elsewhere in the economy. This assumption
is not sensible, especially given that most of
the key constraints to domestication given
by Asian Development Bank (1997) highlight
problems outside the fisheries sector, that is,
infrastructure and transport (seaports,
airports, air transport and land tenure),
appropriate governance and institutional
structures (law and order), and
unsustainable economic policy (economic
instability, failed state capitalism and poor
human resources). It cannot and should not
be assumed that government revenue from
the fisheries sector is best spent directly
stimulating private investment in the
industry. Duncan et al. (1999) noted that
…comparative advantage is too fluid
and too complex for governments to
impose a decree in favour of the
development of certain industries, but
that governments have an
overwhelmingly important role in
creating an environment where private
agents use information efficiently to
search out areas of comparative
advantage (1999:98).
Finally, government policy could
proceed by relying on economic rents and
reorienting government spending to indirect
support of the investment market. By
directing public funds into governance,
institutional strengthening, broad policy
change and investment in education, an
overall economic environment conducive to
private investment will be created. Such an
environment will indirectly benefit all sectors
in the economy, including the fishing sector.
It is important to realise that enhancing
capabilities in the fishing sector will take time
(Pollard 1995), although such indirect
support of the investment market has already
had a positive influence on the private
domestic tuna fleets in Papua New Guinea
and Samoa. Duncan and Temu (1997)
commented that domestication of the tuna
industry should not be forced. Government
should direct spending to the support of the
investment market where this spending will
deliver the greatest good to the community.
Conclusions
There are two major concerns with current
governance of the tuna fishery: the Pacific
island countries are not deriving as much
benefit from its exploitation as they could;
and current management strategies will not
ensure long-term sustainability of the
resource. Three key opportunities for
sustainable economic development of the
industry are regional cooperation in
determining a total allowable catch and how
it is allocated among individual island states,
restricting the total allowable catch, and the
auctioning of resource entitlements.
The South Pacific tuna fishery is the
world’s only fishing ground that is not
currently over-fished. However, the fishery
is now the focus of a growing number of
fishing nations, and at present few controls
are placed on fishing effort. Sound policies
for such control are becoming more
important for the sustainability of the
resource. Due to the migratory nature of the
fish stocks, placing controls on catch size is
a regional issue. Total allowable catch should
be determined for the whole Pacific islands
region, and individual countries given a
quota of this total allowable catch based on
tuna concentrations in their exclusive
economic zones and current catches from the
high seas. In September 2000, the Convention
on the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
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and Central Pacific Ocean was signed by all
Pacific island countries and distant-water
fishing nations (except Japan). The
Convention does not necessitate nor preclude
the resulting Commission from setting the
regional total allowable catch. As the issue
of setting a total allowable catch should not
be a concern for distant-water fishing
nations, it should not be determined by the
Commission but by a regional body
comprising all Pacific island countries.
Giving such a body the power to set the total
allowable catch is a priority for Pacific island
countries to ensure sustainability of the tuna
resource.
The second opportunity for sustainable
economic development relates to the level at
which the regional total allowable catch is
set. There is evidence that there is excess
capacity in both fishing vessels and
canneries. As 40–60 per cent of tuna for
canneries globally is serviced by the South
Pacific, it is likely that a reduction in tuna
supply from the region will increase revenue
derived from the industry as a whole. A
gradual reduction in total allowable catch
will also allow stronger exercising of the
precautionary principle in an industry that
is notoriously difficult to govern.
The third opportunity for sustainable
economic development concerns how Pacific
island countries should allocate their share
of the total allowable catch among individual
fishers. Presently, access rights are negotiated
by resource managers through international
treaties. These treaties encourage under-
reporting, do not ensure the most efficient
fishing firms are allocated the resource right,
and are not transparent. The auctioning of
licences would obviate the incentive for
under-reporting and allow the resource
managers to maximise the economic rent
while needing to know very little about the
true rent value. They would also increase
transparency (as opportunities for direct
dealing with individuals are significantly
reduced) and encourage self-monitoring and
self-enforcement. Auction design will be
important to ensure the bidding is
competitive, and should be the focus of
further research.
By directly encouraging foreign direct
investment to be based locally, many Pacific
island countries are committing the cardinal
policy sin of trying to achieve two objectives
with the one policy instrument. These
objectives are to maximise economic rents and
to establish domestic-based industry.
Subsidising resource access in exchange for
local activities achieves neither goal well. It
is argued that government policy should aim
to maximise economic rents and then reorient
government spending into removing
impediments to private sector investment.
Such government spending would thus be
directed where it will do the greatest good
for the community. If direct support of the
fisheries industry is considered appropriate,
then subsidies should be transparent, and
not delivered through low-cost access and
tax exemptions.
Notes
1 While it is advocated that an output quota of
the regional total allowable catch should be
allocated to each individual country, a mixture
of output and input controls on entitlements
are recommended to be implemented by
each state authority.
2 Forum Fisheries Agency member nations
include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru,
New Zealand, Niue, Republic of the Marshall
Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and
Vanuatu.
3 The territories include three dependencies of
France (French Polynesia, New Caledonia,
and Wallis and Futuna), three of the United
States (American Samoa, Guam and the
Northern Marianas), and one each of Great
Britain (Pitcairn Island) and New Zealand
(Tokelau).
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